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Abstract：The delegating private quantum computation (DQC) protocol with the universal 
quantum gate set  , , , , ,X Z H P R CNOT  was firstly proposed by Broadbent et al., and then Tan 
et al. tried to put forward an half-blind DQC protocol (HDQC) with another universal set 
 , , ,H P CNOT T . However, the decryption circuit of Toffoli gate (i.e., T) is a little redundant, 
and Tan et al.’s protocol exists the information leak. In addition, both of these two protocols just 
focus on the blindness of data (i.e., the client’s input and output), but do not consider the 
blindness of computation (i.e., the delegated quantum operation). For solving these problems, we 
propose a full-blind DQC protocol (FDQC) with quantum gate set  , , ,H P CNOT T , where the 
desirable delegated quantum operation, one of  , , ,H P CNOT T , is replaced by a fixed sequence 
 , , , ,H P CZ CNOT T  to make the computation blind, and the decryption circuit of Toffoli gate 
is also optimized. Analysis shows that our protocol can not only correctly perform any delegated 
quantum computation, but also holds the characteristics of data blindness and computation 
blindness.  
Keywords: Delegating private quantum computation, universal quantum gate set, full-blind, 
Toffoli gate, circuit optimization. 
1. Introduction 
Blind quantum computation (BQC) is a novel model of quantum computation, where the client 
with limited quantum resources can perform quantum computation by delegating the computation 
to an untrusted quantum server, and the privacy of the client can still be guaranteed. As BQC 
provide a convenient and safe way to access the quantum computation, it may be an ideal model 
for the quantum application in the early days of “quantum computer era”. 
BQC can be generally divided into two categories: one is the measurement-based blind quantum 
computation (MBQC), and the other is the circuit-based blind quantum computation (CBQC). In 
MBQC, measurement is the main driving force of computation, which follows the principle of 
“entangle-measure-correct”, and a certain number of quantum qubits are entangled to form a 
standard graph state. To be specific, it first prepares a certain graph state according to the 
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requirements of desirable computation, and measures the first qubit according to the computation, 
then the measurement result will decide the following measurement basis which is known as 
"correction". In 2009, Broadbent et al. [Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi (2008)] proposed the 
first MBQC protocol, where the client generates the rotated single photons, and he sends them to 
the server to build the brickwork state that can implement the specific quantum computation. 
Since then, some other MBQC protocols were proposed [Morimae (2012a); Morimae (2012b); Li 
(2014); Xu (2014); Morimae (2015); Kong (2016)]. 
Different from MBQC, CBQC is based on the traditional circuit, which can be composed of all 
kinds of quantum gates. In 2005, Childs [Childs(2005)] proposed the first CBQC protocol based 
on the ideal of encrypting data with quantum one-time pad [Ambainis(2000); Boykin (2003)], 
however the client must possess quantum memory and the ability to execute the quantum SWAP 
operation. And in 2006, Arrighi and Salvail [Arrighi and Salvail (2006)] proposed another CBQC 
protocol for the calculation of certain functions, i.e., not the universal quantum computation, and 
it requires Alice to prepare and measure multi-qubit entangled states. Since then, some other 
CBQC protocols [Aharonov(2008); Broadbent (2013)] have been proposed. Recently, the concept 
of delegating private quantum computation has been proposed, which belongs to the CBQC 
model. In 2015, Broadbent [Broadbent (2015)] proposed the first delegating private quantum 
computation (DQC) protocol with the universal quantum set  , , , , ,X Z H P R CNOT . In one way, 
they relax the requirements of fully homomorphic encryption [Rivest (1978); Gentry (2009)] by 
allowing interaction. But at the same time, they strengthen the requirements by asking for 
information-theoretic security. Later, Tan et al. [Tan and Zhou (2017)] proposed a half-blind 
DQC protocol (HDQC) with another universal set  , , ,H P CNOT T , where“half-blind” means 
that the server cannot learn anything about client’s input and output (also referred as the blindness 
of data), but client’s computation are exposed to the server, i.e., the blindness of computation 
cannot be guaranteed. Obviously, the half-blindness of quantum computation is undesirable, 
because the privacy of computation is also an important aspect of information security. 
Compared with previous works, the main contribution of our work is to propose a full-blind DQC 
protocol (FDQC) with universal gate set  , , ,H P CNOT T , where the desirable delegated 
quantum operation, one of  , , ,H P CNOT T , is replaced by a fixed sequence 
 , , , ,H P CZ CNOT T  to make the computation blind. In addition, we also optimize the 
decryption circuit of Toffoli gate, and also solve the problem of information leak in Tan et al.’s 
protocol. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we briefly 
review DQC and HDQC. A full-blind delegating private quantum computation protocol with 
universal gate set  , , ,H P CNOT T  is proposed in Sect. 3, and the correctness and 
full-blindness are discussed in Sect. 4. Finally, conclusion is drawn in the last section. 
2. Review of DQC and HDQC 
2.1. Review of DQC 
DQC enables an almost-classical client to delegate the execution of any quantum computation to 
a remote server without exposing his information. The brief process of DQC [Broadbent(2015)] is 
as follows (also shown in Fig. 1). 
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 
Quantum encryption: Client uses Pauli operations X and Z to encrypt quantum state 
 , and then obtains a b
enc
X Z   , where a  and b  are the encryption keys 
randomly selected from 0,1 , after that he sends 
enc
 to the server QC. 
 
 Quantum computation: QC implements the specific quantum computation (certain 
unitary operation U ) on the encrypted quantum state 
enc
 . 
 Quantum decryption: The server returns the output state 
enc
U  to the client. Then 
the client decrypts the output state:  a b a bX Z UX Z U   
 
according to the 
decryption rules, and finally gets the quantum computation result U  . 
a b
enc
X Z 
( )a b
enc
U U X Z 
 a b a bX Z UX Z U   
Client
Quantum Center
 
Figure 1: The main process of DQC model 
As we know, the quantum gate set  , , , , ,X Z H P R CNOT is universal [Nielsen and Chuang 
(2011)], which means it can be used to construct arbitrary quantum computation (i.e., arbitrary 
unitary operation U ). These quantum gates have following properties, 
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And their encryption and decryption circuits are shown in Fig. 2. 
2.1. Review of HDQC 
Besides , , , , ,X Z H P R CNOT ,  , , ,H P CNOT T is another discrete universal quantum gate 
set[Nielsen and Chuang (2011)], where T is the Toffoli gate. As we know, the Toffoli gate is a 
reversible quantum gate which is more frequently used for constructing large-scale and complex 
quantum circuits. Recently, Tan et al. [Tan and Zhou (2017)] proposed a half-blind DQC protocol 
with  , , ,H P CNOT T , and its main contribution is to give the encryption and decryption circuit 
of the T gate. As the encryption and decryption circuits of H, P and CNOT gates are the same as 
Broadbent’s protocol, here we just review the encryption and decryption of Toffoli gate. During 
the encryption process, the client encrypts the first qubit with unitary operation 
a bX Z , the 
second qubit with 
c dX Z  and the third qubit with e fX Z , where the encryption keys
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 , , , , , 0,1a b c d e f   are randomly generated by the client. After the Toffoli gate performed by 
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Figure 2: The encryption and decryption circuit for the universal quantum gate set 
 , , , , ,X Z H P R CNOT [Fisher (2013)] 
the server, the client cooperates with the server to perform the decryption with the extra CZ, 
CNOT and SWAP unitary operations as correction. The whole encryption and decryption circuit 
of Toffoli gate is shown in Fig. 3. 
X
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X Z
X Z
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Z X
X Z X
Z
Encryption circuit Decryption circuit 
 
Figure 3: The encryption and decryption circuit of Toffoli gate. The quantum operations in the 
dotted box denote that they are performed in the server side. 
However, there are two flaws in Tan et al.’s HDQC protocol. First, the protocol is half-blind, i.e., 
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it only guarantees the blindness of the data. Although the server cannot get any information about 
the data, the desirable computation can be obtained by the server because the delegated 
operations are exposed to the server. Second, the protocol exists the information leak. To be 
specific, if the server is performing the Toffoli gate, the client may delegate the server to perform 
some correction operations. Referring to the decryption circuit in Fig. 3, the corrections are 
related with the encryption keys, i.e., the CZ, SWAP and CNOT corrections represent the 
encryption keys f=1, c=1 and (a=1, c=1), respectively. Since the server knows all the delegated 
quantum operations, he can deduce the corresponding encryption key based on the above rules. 
For example, in the HDQC process for Toffoli gate, if the client asks the server to perform a CZ 
operation between the first and second qubit, then the secret key f=1 will be revealed to the 
server. 
3. Full-blind delegating private quantum computation 
3.1. The FDQC protocol 
Suppose that the client delegates the server to implement a certain quantum computation which is 
composed of quantum operations (i.e. quantum gates in , , ,H P CNOT T ), the procedures of 
FDQC are given as follows. 
1. The client generates a 9-qubit sequence S which consists of ancillary qubits and 
message qubits. And then he divides the sequence into five subsequences (The first 
subsequence 
HS  consists of the first qubit, the second subsequence PS  consists of 
the second qubit, the third subsequence 
CZS  consists of the third and fourth qubits, the 
fourth subsequence 
CNOTS  consists of the fifth and sixth qubits, the fifth subsequence 
TS  consists of the remaining three qubits). It should be noted that the five 
subsequences 
HS , PS , CZS , CNOTS and TS  are prepared for the fixed ordered 
operations  , , , ,H P CZ CNOT T . 
2. According to the delegated quantum operation, the client chooses one of 
 , , , ,H P CZ CNOT TS S S S S  as the message part (also called the message subsequence), 
and the other subsequences as the ancillary part (which will be used to confuse the 
delegated operation). For example, if the delegated quantum operation is T gate, then he 
chooses 
TS  as the message part, and the remainder  , , ,H P CZ CNOTS S S S  is the 
ancillary part. 
3. The client encrypts every qubit   in message subsequence by the unitary operation 
a bX Z , where  ,a b  are the encryption keys randomly chosen by him,  , 0,1a b . 
After that, he sends the sequence S to the server. 
4. The server performs the operations  , , , ,H P CZ CNOT T  on the qubits in 
subsequence , , , ,H P CZ CNOT TS S S S S , and returns the output qubits to the client. 
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5. The client extracts the message qubits from the output qubits according to his original 
selection in Step 1, and decrypts them by
a bX Z
 
 with the decryption keys  ,a b   
(the decryption keys and decryption process will be detailed discussed in the next 
subsection). If the delegated quantum operation is T and the encryption keys f=1, c=1 
or a=1, then the client will perform the corrections according to the following rule: if 
f=1, then correction operation is CZ between the first and second qubits; if a=1, then 
correction operation is CNOT between the first and third qubits; if c=1, then correction 
operation is CNOT between the second and third qubits. Then the client delegates the 
server to perform the correction operation as the above steps. 
6. The client and the server repeat the above steps until all the delegated quantum 
operations are completed. 
For ease of understanding, we suppose the client wants to delegate the operation 
1 1
1 0 1 112 2
0 1 12
2 2
U PH
i i i
 
     
            
 
                                       (2) 
to the server, and Fig. 4. describes the whole delegation process of U. 
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CZ 
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CNOT 
Client Client ClientServer Server
 
Figure 4: The delegation process of U = PH in our protocol. 
aux
  is ancillary qubit randomly 
generated by the client. The operations in dotted box are the desirable operations. 
In the proposed FDQC protocol, the fixed order operations  , , , ,H P CZ CNOT T  are all 
performed in each round, which will confuse the delegated quantum operation and finally achieve 
the computation blindness. 
3.2. The encryption and decryption of universal quantum gate set 
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As we know, both  , , , , ,X Z H P R CNOT and  , , ,H P CNOT T  are the universal quantum 
gate sets that can construct arbitrary quantum computation. Compared with other quantum gates, 
the T gate (i.e., Toffoli gate) is used more often as a basic unit for constructing large complex 
circuits. So, we choose the universal quantum set , , ,H P CNOT T  to implement the FDQC 
protocol. 
Through in-depth analysis of the relevant characteristics of H, P,CNOT and Toffoli gates (partly 
shown in Equation (1)), we derive the relevant quantum homomorphic decryption method for 
these gates, and further give the encryption and decryption process for the quantum set 
 , , ,H P CNOT T  in the FDQC protocol. All the encryption and decryption processes for these 
gates can be sketched in Figs. 5-8. 
H b aX Z H 
a bX Z 
 
Figure 5: The encryption and decryption process for H. 
 
P b a bX Z P a bX Z 
 
Figure 6: The encryption and decryption process for P. 
 
a b d a c dX Z X Z CNOT  
a b c dX Z X Z 
X
 
Figure 7: The encryption and decryption process for CNOT. 
 
a b b c d eX Z X Z X Z      13 23 12c a b a c d f e fCNOT X Z CNOT X Z CZ X Z T   
 
Figure 8: The encryption and decryption process for T (i.e., Toffoli gate). 
Since the encryption and decryption circuits of , ,H P CNOT  are given in [Broadbent (2015)] 
and [Tan and Zhou (2017)], here we skip them and focus on the description of Toffoli gate. In our 
study, we simplify the encryption and decryption circuit of Toffoli (shown in Fig. 9). 
bZ
aX
dZcX
fZeX
fZ
fZ eX
dZ
cX
bZ aX
cX aX
 
Figure 9: The encryption and decryption circuit of Toffoli gate. Here, the two-qubit operations in 
dotted box are viewed as correction. 
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Assume that the encryption keys      , , , , ,a b c d e f for the encryption circuit of Toffoli gate is 
randomly generated by the client, he encrypts the first qubit with unitary operation
a bX Z , the 
second qubit with 
c dX Z  and the third qubit with e fX Z  respectively, here 
 , , , , , 0,1a b c d e f  . Obviously, this encryption process is the same as [Tan and Zhou (2017)]. 
Our main contribution is to simplify the decryption process (i.e., decryption circuit). To be 
specific, we get rid of two SWAP gates and re-layout the CNOT operations, which can be shown 
between Fig. 3 and Fig. 9. Different from the decryption circuit for H, P, CNOT, the decryption 
process for Toffoli gate is a little complicated, and the extra correction operations CZ and CNOT 
are needed. As shown in Fig. 8, considering the first special situation that f=1, then the client 
needs to apply a CZ correction between the first and second qubit 3 12 3TZ CZ Z T  . The 
second special situation that c=1, then the client needs to apply a CNOT correction between the 
first and third qubit 2 13 2TX CNOT X T   The third special situation that a=1, then the 
the client needs to apply a CNOT correction between the first and third qubits 
1 23 1TX CNOT X T  . 
 
4. Correctness and security analysis 
4.1. Correctness analysis 
In this section, the correctness of the proposed protocol for Toffoli gate is verified. Since the 
correctness of the processes for H, P and CNOT is already verified in [Broadbent (2015)] and 
[Tan and Zhou (2017)]. Then the only remaining gate is Toffoli gate. Assume that the encryption 
secret keys for the encryption progress of Toffoli gate are      , , , , ,a b c d e f . The verification 
procedure is given as follows. First, assuming that 0b c d e f      then we can get,  
 1 23a a aT X I I X CNOT T                                              (3) 
Assuming that 0a c d e f      then we can get,  
 1 1b bT Z I I Z T                                                       (4) 
Assuming that 0a b d e f      then we can get,  
 2 2 13c c cT I X I X CNOT T                                              (5) 
Assuming that 0a b c e f      then we can get,  
 2 2d dT I Z I Z T                                                       (6) 
Assuming that 0a b c d f      then we can get,  
 2 2e eT I I X X T                                                      (7) 
Assuming that 0a b c d e      then we can get,  
 3 12 3f f fT I I Z CZ Z T                                                 (8) 
Finally, according to equations (3)-(8), we can obtain, 
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 
   13 23 12
a b c d e f
c a b a c d f e f
T X Z X Z X Z
CNOT X Z CNOT X Z CZ X Z T


  
  
                        (9) 
The correctness of the CZ correction can be easily verified, 
   a b c d a b c a c b dCZ X Z X Z X Z X Z CZ                                 (10) 
Given that the correctness of encryption and decryption process of H, P, T, CNOT and CZ has 
been shown, correctness of the proposed FDQC protocol is obvious: after each round delegation, 
the client adjusts his secret keys according to Figs. 5-8. So that he can perform the decryption 
correctly. Because each process of itself is correct, so the proposed FDQC protocol implements 
the quantum computation as desired. 
4.2 Security analysis 
In the client-server scenario, the security of the proposed protocol contains many aspects, but the 
main problem is the security of the data and the computation, and as well as the blindness of the 
message qubits and the delegated quantum operations. The blindness of the message qubits and 
the delegated quantum operations are discussed in the following parts. 
4.2.1 The blindness of data 
Considering the encryption and decryption processes of H, P, CNOT and CZ are the same as 
Broadbent’s DQC protocol, then the processes of the four gates provides the same level of 
security as the original one, which is perfectly (information-theoretic) secure. Therefore, we will 
only focus on the security of encrypted qubits which is performing on the encryption and 
decryption circuit of Toffoli gate. Because the client is not able to perform the CNOT and CZ 
corrections, then the two operations should be delegated to the server. However, once the server 
obtains the information of corrections, then the encryption keys of encrypted qubits are exposed 
(also mentioned in the review of HDQC). 
In order to eliminate the particularity of the corrections, the CZ and CNOT corrections are added 
into the fixed order of gates  , , , ,H P CZ CNOT T  which is performed in each round 
delegation. In each round, the server is asked to perform the five unitary operations 
indistinguishably, therefore there is no mechanism for the server to distinguish the correction 
operation from the other four operations, so the particularity of the corrections disappears, and the 
blindness of encryption keys holds. To be specific, suppose that the desired operation is the 
Toffoli gate in one round delegation, and the encryption key f=1, then the client will delegate the 
server to perform the CZ correction in the next round delegation. However the CZ correction is 
confused by the other four operations, the server is not able to know that the desired operation is 
the CZ correction, then the security of encryption key f is guaranteed. Since the encrypted qubit 
which is performing on the gate set  , , , ,H P CZ CNOT T  is secure, then the blindness of data 
is obvious. 
4.2.1 The blindness of data 
The computation that the client want to implement can be seen as a desirable circuit which is 
made up of the delegated quantum operations, therefore the blindness of computation is 
equivalent to the blindness of the delegated quantum operations. In order to make the delegated 
quantum operations blind, each operation of the delegated quantum operations is replace by the 
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fixed order of gates  , , , ,H P CZ CNOT T , where the H, P, CNOT and T operations are needed 
for the universality, and the CZ and CNOT operations are needed in the decryption process of 
certain operation (such as the Toffoli gate). Client uses ancillary part to confuse the message part, 
there is no mechanism for the server to distinguish the message part and the ancillary part, so the 
server is not able to deduce the desired operations, thus computation that the client wants to 
implement is blind. 
Without loss of generality, we take the delegation of quantum computation U=HP as an example. 
If the client wants to ask the server to perform the U on the encrypted qubit
a bX Z  , then the 
whole produce of FDQC is as follows, he firstly generates a 9-qubit sequence 1S  which consists 
of ancillary qubits and message qubits, where the message qubit is in the subsequence 
pS  (i.e., 
the message part), and the other four subsequence 
HS , CZS , CNOTS  and TS  are the ancillary 
part. The client sends 1S  to the sever to perform the fixed order of gates. Because the server 
cannot distinguish the message part from the ancillary part, he cannot know that the desired 
operation which is performed on the message qubit is the P gate, so in this round, the delegated 
quantum operation P is secure. Then the server sends all the qubits back to the client, the client 
reconstructs the message part and the ancillary part(the ancillary qubits can be reused) according 
to the delegated operation H in next round. He sends new generated 2S  to the server to 
implement the fixed order of gates again, the server still cannot know that the desired operation is 
the H gate in this round. Finally, he sends all the qubits back to client, and when the computation 
a bHPX Z   is done, the client decrypts a bHPX Z   according to the decryption rules. 
During the process, the server cannot learn anything about client’s desired operations, thus, the 
computation is blind. 
5. Conclusion 
As quantum devices are scarce and expensive, it is not hard to imagine that very few companies 
or scientific institutions can have a quantum device or a quantum computer in the foreseeable 
future. It is an impossible mission for the quantum computer to be popularized in the following 
decades. But the delegating private quantum computation provide a solution, which will enables 
the ordinary client with uncomplicated quantum device to perform the quantum computation 
with unconditional security. Thus delegating quantum computation to the remote server has 
strong practical and economic motivation. In recent years, quite a lot delegating private 
computation protocols have been proposed, but some protocols might exist the design flaws that 
might cause some security problems. Therefore the improvement of the existing protocols is also 
an attractive work.  
In this study, we pointed out that the decryption circuit of Toffoli gate is a little complicated and 
the information leaking risk exists in HDQC. For solving the problem of protecting the blindness 
of computation, we propose an full-blind DQC protocol with  , , ,H P CNOT T . In the practical 
application, the quantum gate set  , , ,H P CNOT T  seems more commonly used than 
 , , , , ,X Z H P R CNOT  as the Toffoli gate (i.e., T) is considered to be the basic unit for 
constructing complex quantum circuits. So the research on DQC with  , , ,H P CNOT T  is a 
meaningful work. In the proposed protocol, although we have optimized the decryption circuit of 
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Toffoli gate, it still needs multiple interactions. One of our future work is to further simplify the 
decryption circuit of Toffoli gate, and reduce the times of interaction, even get rid of the 
interaction. 
As FDQC can provide a secure “client-server” mode for universal quantum computation, one 
hand, we can try to use this model to solve some classic security calculation problems [Pradeep 
(2016); Cao (2018); Liu (2018)]. Another another important work is to combine DQC with some 
practical quantum protocols, such as quantum key agreement [Liu (2017); Liu (2018)], quantum 
private comparison [Yang (2009); Liu (2014a); Liu
 
(2014b); Liu (2014c)], quantum sealed-bid 
Auction [Liu (2014d); Liu (2016)], which will be another interesting direction to be further 
studied. We conclude this paper with an expectation that the works reported here will be realized 
experimentally and further applied in the daily life. 
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